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Abstract IMSI Catchers are tracking devices that break the privacy
of the subscribers of mobile access networks, with disruptive effects to
both the communication services and the trust and credibility of mobile
network operators. Recently, we verified that IMSI Catcher attacks are
really practical for the state-of-the-art 4G/LTE mobile systems too. Our
IMSI Catcher device acquires subscription identities (IMSIs) within an
area or location within a few seconds of operation and then denies ac-
cess of subscribers to the commercial network. Moreover, we demonstrate
that these attack devices can be easily built and operated using readily
available tools and equipment, and without any programming. We de-
scribe our experiments and procedures that are based on commercially
available hardware and unmodified open source software.
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1 Introduction
1.1 IMSI Catchers
IMSI Catchers are active attack devices against the radio link protocols in mo-
bile networks with the main goal of collecting IMSIs (International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identities), the subscribers’ identifiers used in the authentication and ac-
cess control procedures. In particular, these attacks break one of the important
security requirements set in the international specifications, namely the privacy
and non-traceability of the subscriber. The malicious devices usually act as a
man-in-the-middle to fulfil more advanced attacks. IMSI Catchers can be used
for mass-surveillance of individuals in a geographical area, or link a real person
to his/her identity in the network, trace a person with a known IMSI (check
his/her presence in a building or area), eavesdrop on private conversations, all
these being privacy issues concerns. IMSI disclosure is a direct consequence of
the poor cryptographic mechanism used or its improper usage. On the other
hand, DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks introduce serious financial losses on a tar-
geted operator, as the subscribers cannot access the mobile services; moreover,
other services that use the mobile infrastructure are impacted by the network
unavailability; these include emergency calls or SMSs containing one-time codes
for two-way authentication mechanisms used in the bank sector.
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1.2 Related Work
IMSI Catchers were first built for 2G/GSM, and later extended to 3G/UMTS
protocols. Until recently LTE (Long Term Evolution) protocols were considered
secure against these privacy attacks due to the stronger authentication and key
exchange mechanisms. This claim has now been proved to be incorrect both by
ourselves and others. Independently of our work, Shaik et al. showed that IMSI
Catchers can be built for LTE mobile networks with similar consequences as for
2G and 3G networks [1]. The vulnerabilities in LTE protocols allow an adver-
sary to trace the location of users with fine granularity, enable DoS attacks, or
eavesdropping on the communication [1–5]. General techniques to set up attacks
against LTE include traffic capture, jamming and downgrade to 2G. All these
academic works implement IMSI Catchers by modifying the code of open-source
software projects, such as OpenLTE [6], srsLTE [7, 8] or gr-LTE [9]. Rupprecht
et al. have very recently used Open Air Interface (OAI) [10] to test compliance
of UE (User Equipment) with the LTE standard with respect to encryption and
to exemplify a man-in-the-middle attack, but they assume that the UE tries
to connect to the rogue base station [5]. Most of the works use OpenLTE code
because, according to these researchers, the OpenLTE architecture is easier to
modify. We use the unmodified OAI software here for the purpose of building
an IMSI Catcher.
1.3 Summary of Results
Our main goal here is to demonstrate that it is easy to build a low-cost LTE
IMSI Catcher that requires absolutely no programming skills, but only readily
available standard equipment and tools. Although other related works show that
an IMSI Catcher for LTE can be built, they all require modification to the source
code. We are the first to build an LTE IMSI Catcher using existing “commercial
off the shelf” hardware and readily available software only. This result demon-
strates that anyone who has basic operational computer skills (installing and
running software) can mount an IMSI Catcher attack; in particular, our attack
set up requires no programming.
A second, but no less important, result is the ability of the adversary to
perform a DoS attack, under the same conditions. The access to the authorised
mobile network is controlled by the adversary in time and space: UEs are denied
mobile services within the area of the rogue eNodeBs for the time they are active.
Again, our attack set up requires no programming skills.
2 LTE Mobile Networks
2.1 LTE Architecture
LTE architecture (see Figure 1) consists of two parts: EUTRAN (Evolved Uni-
versal Terrestrial Radio Access Network) and EPC (Evolved Packet Core), each
of them being composed of several components that we briefly described next.
Figure 1: LTE Architecture
UE (User Equipment) refers to the mobile user terminal. It contains a USIM
(Universal Subscriber Identity Module), which stores the IMSI (International
Mobile Subscriber Identity) and the associated permanent secret key, used to
derive temporary keys for authentication and encryption. IMSI is a permanent
unique value that globally identifies the subscriber.
eNodeB (evolved NodeB) is the base station that communicates with UEs by
radio links and represents the access point to the operator’s network.
MME (Mobile Management Entity) is responsible for authentication and re-
sources allocation to UEs. It manages the mobility of UEs in the network when
eNodeBs cannot.
HSS (Home Subscriber Server) stores the authentication parameters, private
keys and other details about the UEs.
S-GW (Serving Gateway) is an interconnection point between EUTRAN and
EPC, being and anchor point for intra-LTE mobility.
P-GW (PDN Gateway) is a routing point to provide connectivity to the
external PDN(Packet Data Network).
A mobile network is identified by MCC (Mobile Country Code) and MNC
(Mobile Network Code). The MCC and MNC are publicly available online [11].
An eNodeB controls a set of cells running at a specific frequency in an LTE
band, or equivalently, on an EARFCN (EUTRA Absolute Radio-Frequency
Channel Number) [12, 13]. The frequency ranges allocated to the network op-
erators are also public information [14]. Several cells in a geographically region
form a TAC (Tracking Area Code), which is managed by a single MME. The
eNodeB broadcasts information such as MCC, MNC or TAC via SIB (System
Information Block) messages. This allows the UE to identify the operator. To
attach to the network, UE then sends an ATTACH REQUEST message to the
eNodeB. If UE moves to a new area, it initiates a TAU REQUEST and a TRACK-
ING AREA UPDATE procedure is performed.
We skip other details here, but invite the reader to refer to the specifications
for more details [15, 16].
2.2 LTE Cell Selection and Reselection
A mobile device that attempts to access the mobile network performs a cell selec-
tion procedure. This means that the UE searches for a suitable cell and chooses
to camp on the one that provides the best service. If later on the UE finds a
more suitable cell (according to some reselection criteria), then it performs cell
reselection and camps onto the new cell. Cell selection and reselection in LTE
mobile networks are complex processes involving several steps and different cri-
teria [17,18]. We do not describe the complete processes here, but only highlight
the aspects that are further required for the understanding of our work.
When the UE is switched on, it camps on a cell within a PLMN (Public Land
Mobile Network) selected accordingly to a list stored locally and some selection
criteria. In practice, the selected PLMN corresponds to the last mobile network
the UE had successfully connected to before switch off. Note that this is not
always the home PLMN (the mobile network the USIM belongs to).
At reselection, the UE monitors intra-frequency, inter-frequency and inter-
RAT (Radio Access Technology) cells indicated by the serving cell. In the follow-
ing, we refer to inter-frequency reselection, as its understanding is a prerequisite
for our results. The UE performs inter-frequency reselection when it camps on a
cell that runs on a different frequency than the serving cell. First level criterion
for reselection is the absolute priority list: the UE always monitors and tries to
camp on cells that run on higher priority frequencies. The eNodeB of the serving
cell broadcasts in clear the list of absolute priorities (along with other reselection
parameters) in SIB messages. For each frequency that is listed, cellReselection-
Priority field defines its absolute priority, where 0 indicates the lowest priority
and 7 indicates the highest priority. Note that LTE reselection uses the radio
link quality as second level criteria, so simply running a rogue eNodeB in the
vicinity of the UE does not automatically trigger a reselection.
Operators use the absolute priority frequency criteria to gain robust coverage.
They design the network such that within an area coexist multiple cells that run
on distinct frequencies with associated priorities. In case of incidents or network
congestion on the highest priority frequency, the UE will not lose connectivity,
but reselect a cell that runs on the next priority frequency. Deciding the number
of frequency levels that should coexist in an area and their associated priorities
is a task of the design network engineer.
2.3 Security Requirements and the Adversarial Model
The main goals of the adversary are to collect IMSIs and to deny network avail-
ability. The adversary is constrained in both budget and technical skills, so it
aims for a low-cost and simple attack that only requires basic computer knowl-
edge. Our adversary will only use commercially available hardware and unmod-
ified open source software.
Furthermore, the adversarial model follows the one of previous work [1, 3].
The attacker is active in the sense that it can build up a rogue eNodeB that inter-
acts with the UEs. The model of a passive adversary (an adversary that can only
sniff LTE traffic, but cannot actively interfere) is inappropriate both for practi-
cal and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, active adversaries have been
proved successful, so LTE mobile networks must protect against them, while on
the theoretical side TMSIs (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities) have been
introduced as a security measure starting with 2G. TMSIs are temporary values
that replace the IMSIs in the process of subscribers’ identification, minimising
the transmission of IMSIs through the air and hence drastically decreasing the
chances of a passive adversary to collect them.
3 Equipment and Tools
3.1 Hardware
Only Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices have been used in our attack
setup. The hardware components that we used for our experiments (excluding
the mobile phones) are shown in Figure 2.
Computers. We used two different computers: one Intel NUC D54250WYK
(i5-4250U CPU@1.30GHz) and one Lenovo ThinkPad T460s (i7-6600U CPU@
2,30GHz). Both run 64-bit Kubuntu 14.04 kernel version 3.19.0-61-low latency
and have USB3 ports, which are prerequisites for running the OAI software. The
Intel NUC computer was attached with standard peripherals (display screen,
mouse, keyboard).
USRPs. The B200mini is a USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral)
from Ettus Research that can be programmed to operate over a wide radio-
frequency range (70MHz - 6GHz), communicating in full duplex. It can be used
for all of the LTE frequency bands. The technical specifications of the B200mini
are available at [19]. We used two USRP B200mini to set up the eNodeBs.
User Equipment. We used a Samsung Galaxy S4 device to find the LTE
channels and TACs used in the targeted area. For testing the IMSI Catcher, we
used two LG Nexus 5X phones running Android v6. We used different USIMs
Figure 2: Experimental Hardware (excluding UEs)
from the two biggest Norwegian operators, and the two biggest Romanian oper-
ators (see Section 5).
The total hardware cost is less than 3000EUR. Any two OAI compatible
computers and USRPs can be used to mount the experiments [20]. Also, a sin-
gle mobile device is sufficient if it can provide the minimal information needed
(EARFCN and TAC) for setting up the rogue eNodeBs. So, the minimal kit
includes: two computers and two USRPs for the network side and one mobile
device with a USIM from the targeted mobile operator for the client side. Keep-
ing the configuration to minimum, cost might be decreased. Also, we expect the
costs to be significantly lower in the near future.
3.2 Software
We used open-source freely available software that did not require any modifi-
cation for our purposes to build and run the 4G/LTE IMSI Catcher.
Service and Testing Modes. Seen as a facility of the operating system and
the privilege rights of the user, service or testing modes of mobile devices offer
important information about the LTE network. We describe, for comparison, the
information displayed by the two types of phones we used during the experiments
Samsung phones offer LTE connection details by default [21]. To access Ser-
vice Mode, call *#0011#. The most important pieces of information are the
EARFCN DL (downlink EARFCN) and the TAC. Other interesting informa-
tion include the MCC, MNC and Cell ID. Refer to Figure 3(a) for more details.
Android phones (including Samsung phones) access Testing Mode by calling
*#*#4636#*#*. This is a feature available on all Android phones, which does
(a) Service Mode
(Samsung, root)
(b) Testing Mode
(Android, non-root)
Figure 3: Service and Testing Modes
not necessarily display EARFCN DL by default (it is dependent of the Android
version), but displays information about several LTE cells that coexist in the
area on which the phone might downgrade to in case the actual cell becomes
unavailable. Figure 3(b) shows the Testing Mode of a LG Nexus 5X display. The
UE is registered to the first displayed cell (mRegistered=YES), while the others
are showed to be accessible. However, last versions of Android or applications
such as LTE G-Net Track Lite or NetCell Tracker [22, 23] (in root mode) can
provide EARFCN DL and other information in a user-friendly format.
OAI (Open Air Interface). OAI is open source software that implements
both the core network (EPC) and access-network (EUTRAN) of 3GPP cellular
networks [10,24]. Currently, it provides a standard compliant implementation of
Release 10 LTE and establishes generic interfaces with various hardware manu-
factures (including Ettus Research). Basically, the LTE network is emulated on
a computer, and the USRP is used as the radio platform for the eNodeB imple-
mentation. It is recommended to run EPC and EUTRAN on different machines,
but OAI accepts both on a single computer too. For our tests, keeping in mind
the goal of a low-cost IMSI Catcher, we used two machines, one for each of the
two rogue eNodeBs that must run concurrently.
OpenBTS. OpenBTS is an open source software development project for
GSM mobile networks [25]. OpenRegistration in OpenBTS allows an IMSI that
match a given regular expression to access the network. The one-sided authenti-
cation protocol of GSM permits the OpenBTS process to accept mobile terminals
without proper mutual authentication. Note that we have used OpenBTS for
testing purposes only, to make a roaming USIM connect to a masquerade home
network, but this is not a prerequisite for setting up the LTE IMSI Catcher (see
Section 5.4).
4 The LTE IMSI Catcher
We now describe how we built and operated our LTE IMSI Catcher. We ran two
rogue eNodeBs using the OAI software, and set up with the proper configuration
files. One rogue eNodeB (called eNodeB Jammer from now on) causes the UE to
detach from the serving cell that it is camped on, and to reselect to our rogue
cell set up by the second eNodeB (called eNodeB Collector), which masquerades
as an authorized eNodeB but with higher signal power.
The eNodeB Collector broadcasts the MCC and the MNC of the target net-
work operator to impersonate the real network. The eNodeB Collector signals a
TAC value different from the commercial one, which brings the UE to initiate
a TAU REQUEST message. For simplicity, we configured it to the next available
TAC (TAC of the commercial network + 1). We found that the TAC must not
be changed for multiple runs of the experiment (assuming the commercial TAC
is unchanged), therefore we kept this value constant. Besides the MCC-MNC of
the target network, the eNodeB Collector must run on the LTE EARFCN (the
absolute physical radio channel) which corresponds to the highest priority next
to the jammed channel. This assures that the UE prefers the eNodeB Collector
prior to any other commercial eNodeB in the area. The eNodeB Jammer is turned
on, using the radio channel of the cell that the UE camps on. This jams the radio
interface and decreases the signal of the commercial eNodeB under the specified
threshold (see Section 2), causing the UE to trigger a new search for available eN-
odeBs. The UE tries to camp to the cell that runs on the next priority frequency
and provides the best signal, namely the rogue eNodeB.
We divide the adversarial actions into two main phases:
Phase 1. Gather the configuration parameters (EARFCN and TAC):
1. Connect a mobile phone to the target network and read the EARFCN DL
and TAC;
2. Configure and run the eNodeB Jammer, using the MCC and MNC of the
target network and the EARFCN DL from the previous step;
3. Read the new value of EARFCN DL, after the UE performs reselection.
Phase 2. Configure and run the LTE IMSI Catcher:
1. Configure and run the eNodeB Collector, using the MCC and MNC of the
target network, a different TAC than the one in Phase 1.1 and the EAR-
FCN DL set to the value in Phase 1.3 ;
2. Configure and run the eNodeB Jammer, using the MCC and MNC of the
target network and the EARFCN DL set to the value in Phase 1.1.
The channel displayed in Phase 1.1 is associated with the highest priority
(unless the signal power is below the reselection threshold, see Section 2.2). The
UE connects to it even if the signal power is not so strong. This can be easily
seen by comparing the information displayed by the mobile device before and
after the eNodeB Jammer is turned on. The channel in Phase 1.3 has either
the same priority, but lower signal power, or lower priority, regardless the signal
power. Once the eNodeB Jammer is active, this triggers an ATTACH REQUEST
message from the UE to the eNodeB Collector. Then the UE will reveal its IMSI
as a response to an IDENTITY REQUEST query from our Collector cell.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 Introduction
All our experiments were run in our wireless security lab at the university. We
intend our work to be a motivation for solving the problem of privacy attacks in
mobile networks both in existing and emerging systems at the technical specifi-
cation level, as well as for mobile network operators to use the already existing
security mechanisms.
Figure 4: IMSI Capture
Figure 5: ATTACH REJECT Message
5.2 IMSI Catching
We successfully ran experiments with three subscriptions from two mobile op-
erators in Norway, testing two, respectively one USIM card for each. For all,
we used the same mobile device, the LG Nexus 5X. To respect privacy of other
users, IMSI values were captured from our own USIM cards only.
All the three IMSIs used for tests were successfully captured by the eN-
odeB Collector within a few seconds after the eNodeB Jammer is switched on.
Figure 4 shows a portion from the log file that contains a captured IMSI.
Experiments were repeated several times, with different values for Cell ID
or eNodeB ID. They were all successful, so we conclude there is no protection
mechanism in place (e.g. a list of accepted cells, TACs or timers).
5.3 Denial-of-Service
We observed that running the IMSI Catcher results in a DoS attack because au-
thentication fails after the UE triggers the ATTACH REQUEST and consequently
sends its identity as a response to the IDENTITY REQUEST. This is normal, as
the IMSI is not recognised by the HSS as a valid subscriber and no handover
procedures can be accomplished. The eNodeB Collector responds to the UE with
ATTACH REJECT cause 3 (Illegal UE), making the UE to consider the network
unavailable until reboot (Figure 5) [16].1
If the UE is powered off and on again while our rogue eNodeBs are still up,
the UE keeps failing to camp on any cell. This turns into a controlled DoS attack
against the target network in the area covered. This DoS mode remains active
as long as the rogue eNodeBs are up.
1 Depending on the exact software version of OAI being used, UE connectivity to the
eRogueB fails in various ways, but all end up with DoS until the reboot of UE.
Figure 6: IMSI Capture in Roaming
5.4 Roaming
An even simpler IMSI Catcher is available for USIMs in a roaming situation,
in particular under restricted scenarios like airport arrivals. The adversary can
now run a single rogue eNodeB with the MCC and MNC of the home network.
We distinguish 2 scenarios: (1) USIMs that are inactive in roaming (roaming
was not activated or the user travels to a country without any roaming agree-
ments with the home network) and (2) USIMs that are active in roaming, but
did not connect to any network while in roaming. For both cases, the UE reveals
its IMSI on power on, if the IMSI Catcher is up and running at that time.
USIMs inactive in roaming. A USIM for which roaming is disabled is
directly susceptible to an LTE IMSI Catcher using the same MCC and MNC
as the home network. Hence, to setup an IMSI Catcher in this scenario, an
adversary simply configures the corresponding MNC and MCC, then runs OAI.
The LTE frequency band, EARFCN or any other information are irrelevant in
this scenario. If the IMSI Catcher is running when the UE is turned on, then
the UE will try to camp on the cell that masquerades the HPLMN and hence,
responds to the IDENTITY REQUEST message with its IMSI.
We carried out this attack using an inactive LTE USIM card from one of the
most known Romanian mobile operators. Figure 6 shows the IMSI, as captured
by the IMSI Catcher as a response to an IDENTITY REQUEST message.
USIM active in roaming. A USIM for which roaming is enabled is sus-
ceptible to an IMSI Catcher built as previously explained, when the UE is first
powered on in roaming. Once connected in roaming, the UE will not search for
its home network because in practice, regardless of the specifications, the UE
will always try to connect to the most recent network for which the connec-
tion was successfully (this is an issue inherited from previous generations, as
for example it exists in GPRS also [26]). The scenario could make sense on an
airport: the user turns off its device (or equivalently, enable the fly mode) while
connected to the home network and later turns it on (or equivalently, disables
the fly mode) after landing, in the presence of a rogue eNodeB that simulates
the home network. The UE will try to connect to the rogue eNodeB and hence,
it will reveal its IMSI as a response to the IDENTITY REQUEST message. Such
an IMSI Catcher might be used by agencies that want to survey the presence of
people arriving from specific countries to their own territory in a hidden manner
(without revealing their intentions by asking official documents from the border
authorities). Independent work considers this scenario in theory and proposes
correctness and completeness of location update trails and geographically plau-
sibility of location updates to address this issue [27]. We have hereby certified
this functionality.
We performed the experiment by using an active LTE USIM card belonging
to another network operator in Romania. As the USIM had been already active in
roaming, we simulated the test case by connecting it to a fictive 2G network that
masquerades the home network. For this, we used OpenBTS in OpenRegistration
mode. After the UE connected to the GSM network, we switched it to 4G and
immediately turned it off. At power on, the UE tried to connect to the rogue
eNodeB that simulated the home 4G network and then revealed its IMSI.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, our experiments have verified, independently of other works, that
IMSI-catching indeed can be done for the 4G/LTE system too. We claim that (1)
IMSIs can be collected by the eNodeB Collector, and (2) DoS (Denial-of-Service)
is performed automatically after the UE receives an attach rejection message
(with a specific cause). The 4G/LTE is vulnerable to active privacy attacks
by IMSI Catcher, and we found that these attacks can be done quite easily
and therefore can impact the confidence and reliability of commercial mobile
networks. We showed that these attacks are not limited to clever programmers
with special hardware. We hope that this report, and others, will make the
4G/LTE service providers aware of this threat, and lead to demands for improved
privacy and security protocols in the mobile networks.
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